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Perceived fairness and satisfaction with the division of housework 
among dual-earner couples in Italy 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
A well-documented paradox in family literature is that the majority of married women 
and men consider the division of household labor to be fair, although its distribution is 
quite uneven. In this article I report results from a survey on 404 dual-earner couples 
with young children living in Torino (Italy). A small proportion of wives and husbands 
(13.6% and 5.7% respectively) reported both unfairness and dissatisfaction with the 
division of housework. The absolute majority (55%) of both wives and husbands 
perceived fairness and satisfaction, even if most of the chores loads on wives’ shoulders 
for about two thirds. To explain these judgments, elements of Thompson’s distributive 
justice theoretical framework were operationalized and tested. A critical reassessment of 
these elements is provided, based on empirical findings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A well-known paradox has been documented in the literature about subjective aspects of 
the intra-household division of housework, perceived fairness in particular: the majority 
of married women consider the division of household labor with their husbands to be 
fair, although wives actually do most of the housework and care tasks (Baxter & 
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Western, 1998; Blair & Johnson, 1992; Braun et al., 2008; Greenstein, 1996, 2009).1 
This fact helps to understand why equality in the home is so difficult to achieve. 
Although the time spent in housework by women and men has changed a great deal in 
the last decades (Bianchi et al., 2000; Gershuny, 2000; see Romano & Bruzzese, 2008 
for findings about Italy), equity does not coincide with equality for most couples. Given 
the consequences of perceived fairness for individual well-being and marital outcomes 
(Claffey & Manning, 2010; Lively, 2010; Piña & Bengston, 1993; Suitor, 1991; Wilkie 
et al., 1998), this issue seems an important topic of the research agenda on the 
household division of labor. 
Most of the existing studies about fairness perception draws on large and nationally 
representative samples (e.g., International Social Survey Program, National Survey of 
Families and Households, etc.) whose advantages are well-known: generalizability, 
precise estimates, cross-country or cross-time comparability. However, testing specific 
hypotheses derived from theory can often only be performed indirectly or is even 
impossible because of the lack of variables that accurately operationalize the concepts 
behind them. Italy, moreover, is often excluded from analyses since it did not 
participate in cross-country data collection projects (e.g., ISSP 2002). Yet Italy is an 
interesting case study because of the relative strength of family ties and persisting 
traditional gender roles (Künzler, 2002; Solera, 2009: ch. 3). It is thus a good test field 
for theories of fairness perception. 
In this article, I used a small sample survey conducted specifically to investigate the 
reasons why so many women and men consider an objective inequality to be fair and 
satisfying. For this purpose, I operationalized several concepts borrowed from 
Thompson’s (1991) distributive justice framework and tested whether tolerance toward 
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inequality is raised by the outcomes of certain interpersonal comparisons, by the 
affective/symbolic value attached to doing housework and by specific justifications 
mobilized to make sense of existing arrangements.  
The analysis offered here presents three improvements over previous studies: 1) it 
provides a better understanding of equity perception by combining perceived fairness 
and satisfaction ratings, which have never before been taken into account 
simultaneously, 2) it compares women’s and men’s views on the matter, which it is not 
often the case in prior research, and 3) it provides one of the few empirical tests and a 
critical re-assessment of the theoretical concepts proposed by Thompson. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON 
HOUSEWORK AND FAIRNESS 
 
At least three main theoretical perspectives have something to say about the sense of 
fairness in family relations, and have been used in most empirical research. These 
perspectives are social exchange theory, gender theory – particularly the “doing gender” 
perspective and other culturalist or symbolic interactionist viewpoints – and a strand of 
social psychology on distributive justice developed by Major (1987) and Thompson 
(1991). Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Curtis, 1986; Homans, 1961) has many  
points of contact with relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) as regards the role of 
social comparisons, as well as with equity theory (Adams, 1965). It predicts that 
perceived equity depends on the input-output balance of exchange, on power relations 
and individual expectations. Power in social relations generates dependency, which 
affects fairness evaluation by lowering individual expectations: the weakest member of 
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the relationship is more dependent on it, and will thus have fewer alternatives to the 
relationship. This in turn entails that the weakest member will have lower expectations 
about what s/he is entitled to receive from the relationship. The social exchange 
perspective has been applied to the division of housework by Lennon & Rosenfield 
(1994) and DeMaris & Longmore (1996). The former authors found some support for 
the hypotheses they tested, whereas the latter’s findings were not clearly in favor of the 
hypotheses derived from social exchange theory. 
The “doing gender” approach (Deutsch, 2007; West & Zimmerman, 1987) has often 
been adopted to explain the uneven distribution of housework in the family: the so-
called “gender display” or “deviance-neutralization” hypothesis would explain why 
women do more housework than their husbands even when they contribute more to 
household income (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004; 
Greenstein, 2000; see also Gupta, 2007 for a critique). A number of studies found 
evidence that endorsement of traditional family roles (as indicators of gender ideology) 
is associated with more housework time, net of economic resources and other socio-
demographic characteristics (Bianchi et al., 2000; Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005; Lachance-
Grzela & Bouchard, 2010). The corollary of the gender approach for fairness evaluation 
is that the sense of justice about a given household arrangement is affected by the 
symbolic value attached to housework and care activities. Traditional gender ideologies 
and identities, reinforced by consistent behavior, legitimize and make sense of uneven 
distributions of household labor which are not perceived as unfair. According to 
Greenstein (1996, p. 31) ‘gender ideology functions as a kind of lens through which 
inequalities in the division of household labor are viewed’. Linking gender ideology 
with comparison referents and relative deprivation (see Crosby, 1976), he also 
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concludes that ‘gender ideology serves to provide married women with a comparative 
referent’.  
Gender theory has guided several empirical studies, which, however, found mixed 
evidence for it: according to Blair and Johnson (1992), gender ideology does not affect 
fairness judgments, while it does for DeMaris & Longmore (1996) and Baxter & 
Western (1998). According to Greenstein (1996), gender ideology influences fairness 
evaluation through its interaction with the division of housework. In a similar vein, 
Lavee and Katz (2002) explored the moderating effect of gender ideology on the 
relation between division of labour, perceived fairness and perceived marital quality. 
Greenstein (2009) recently returned to the issue with a comparative analysis of 30 
nations. The focus here is on the effect of national contexts, which is assumed to 
provide women with a relevant comparison standard. His analysis confirms the 
hypothesized role of national contexts as moderators of the effect of inequalities 
(distribution of housework) on the perception of fairness: the effect is strongest in 
nations with high levels of gender equity. Another comparative analysis by Braun and 
colleagues (2008) arrived at results similar to Greenstein’s as regards the role of macro-
level factors. 
Social exchange, “doing gender”, and gender ideology are classic references in the 
study of the division of household labor and also provide useful insights on fairness 
perception. However, the viewpoints they offer on the latter issue are only partial. I 
believe that a more complete picture is given by the third theoretical perspective 
mentioned above – the distributive justice framework – which I will focus on in my 
empirical analysis. In the following, I review the literature dealing with this theoretical 
proposition and motivate the sample I selected to test certain hypotheses. 
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The distributive justice framework was developed by Thompson (1991) building on 
previous work by Major (1987). Thompson takes the three factors outlined by Major – 
outcomes values, comparison referents, and justifications – and elaborates further on 
them on the basis of various empirical contributions.  
Outcome values are the desired outcomes that partners want from the relationship. 
Thompson argues that value in family relationships is not given only by the amount of 
time one devotes to household tasks. In other words, there is a symbolic value, 
displayed and exchanged in doing housework and care activities, that should not be 
underestimated. 
Comparison referents are the standards against which the division of labor is evaluated 
in order to assess its fairness. Relevant referents can be other individuals or a 
comparison rule. What is not taken for granted is that the comparison referent must be 
the partner and the comparison rule be equality (50-50). According to Major (1987, 
1994), within-gender comparisons are more likely to reduce feelings of injustice: when 
women compare themselves to other women in similar conditions or their husbands to 
other men, it is likely that they perceive their home arrangement as fair(er). As regards 
the comparison rule, much depends on how wives interpret their contribution to 
household income with paid and unpaid work. In other words, for women to feel 
entitled to more from their husbands, they have to recognize their paid work as a 
necessary contribution to family income and to see their housework and childcare 
activities as “real” work, with the same dignity as waged work.  
Finally, justifications are beliefs about the appropriateness of the procedures that created 
the existing division of family work. Two important justifications concern “procedural 
justice” and standards of cleanliness. The former involves the participatory process that 
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led to the outcome: if women believe that decisions were made jointly, they should have 
fewer reasons to complain about their husbands and hence to feel unfairness. The latter 
is about personal preferences for cleanliness and tidiness in the house: whoever has 
lower standards (and hence less need) should feel entitled to be less involved in 
housework.2 
The merit of Thompson’s frame of analysis rests precisely in its capacity to link 
together various explanatory elements suggested by different and earlier theoretical 
perspectives. On the psychological side, the main mechanism it implies is the reduction 
of cognitive dissonance: objective inequalities in the distribution of housework must be 
accommodated either through appropriate beliefs systems (justifications and outcome 
values), or through an explicit recognition of injustice which eventually will entail 
behavioral change (i.e., a more balanced division of housework or the couple’s 
separation in extreme cases). On the sociological side, Thompson’s framework 
combines elements of both gender and relative deprivation theory. Comparison 
standards and relevant referents are also determinant factors in relative deprivation 
conditions, although the case of men would perhaps be better understood in terms of 
relative advantage (Leach et al., 2002). Outcome values and justifications, to a certain 
extent, can be conceived of as nothing but ‘practical consequences’ of gender ideology, 
since the latter is the general, abstract universe of meaning that shapes beliefs about 
what is the ‘real’ value of housework and how to assess the legitimacy of its distribution 
within the household. 
A study dealing explicitly with Thompson’s theory is Hawkins et al.’s research (1995), 
further replicated in a later study (Hawkins et al., 1998). Hawkins and his colleagues 
operationalized the concepts of Thompson’s analytical framework and demonstrated 
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their direct and indirect effects on the sense of fairness, giving substantial support to the 
theory. Other small-sample studies (Freudenthaler & Mikula, 1998; Himsel & 
Goldberg, 2003; Kluwer et al., 2002) also employed Thompson’s framework: all found 
support for the effects of various comparison referents and justifications on perceived 
fairness. By contrast, Gager (1998) adopted a qualitative approach to explore spouses’ 
use of justifications and to describe the specific valued aspects of housework and 
comparison referents among 25 dual-earner couples. From her qualitative data, she also 
derived some suggestions for survey data collection.  
Other studies (Blair & Johnson, 1992; Gager & Hohmann-Marriot, 2006; John et al., 
1995; Sanchez, 1994) used Thompson’s theory to interpret results of empirical research 
that did not measure variables directly suggested by that theoretical perspective. 
Although limited by similar constraints, Sanchez & Kane (1996) showed that perceived 
housework qualities, as an indicator of valued outcomes, were as important as 
predictors of fairness perception as other “pragmatic” factors. A recent study by 
Kawamura & Brown (2010) elaborated further on the concept of outcome values by 
extending its meaning to that of ‘mattering’, i.e. the extent to which wives believe they 
are important to their husbands. The authors devised a careful operationalization of this 
concept, which proved to be a good predictor of perceived fairness in a sample of 
middle-aged married women. 
 
The present study is devoted to operationalizing concepts and testing several hypotheses 
derived from Thompson’s theoretical framework, using a sample of dual-earner couples 
with young children. The choice of this specific population was motivated by the fact 
that fairness in the division of domestic tasks is likely to be a much more salient issue in 
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this kind of household because parents, especially mothers, are often under time 
pressure from the competing demands of work and caregiving responsibilities.  
Thompson’s distributive justice framework does not explicitly apply to dual-earner 
couples only, although the author often refers to Hochschild’s (1989) qualitative 
analysis of dual-earner couples to exemplify and justify her reasoning. Yet, even if there 
are no specific reasons to assume that this framework cannot be applied to the whole 
population of couples, it seems more sensible to test its empirical consequences on dual-
earner couples, since housework inequalities are more likely the topic of discussion and 
disagreement among such couples. This is particularly true in Italy, where dual-earner 
couples (especially with children) are not yet the norm and working mothers experience 
considerable difficulties in balancing work and family responsibilities. Therefore, if 
Thompson’s hypotheses are true, their validity can be displayed most clearly here. In 
previous research specifically addressing the operationalization of Thompson’s concepts 
(see above), four out of five studies focused on small samples of dual-earner couples 
(Freudenthaler & Mikula, 1998; Hawkins et al., 1998; Hawkins et al., 1995; Himsel & 
Goldberg, 2003). In other studies dealing with the general topic of perceived fairness, 
the target population was either dual-earner or all couples; in some cases analyses were 
kept separated for employed and non employed women (Blair & Johnson, 1992). 
 
THE PRESENT STUDY: DATA AND MEASURES 
 
Survey description 
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The target population consists of dual-earner couples, with at least one child up to 12 
years old, living in Torino and the surrounding metropolitan area. Torino is located in 
North-West Italy, in a region with a relatively high rate of female employment: in 
Piemonte, the region of which Torino is the administrative capital, the employment rate 
of women aged 15-64 was 56.3% in 2007, as opposed to 46.6% for Italy as a whole. In 
this respect, Torino is more representative of metropolitan areas in North-Central Italy. 
However, if we consider dual-earner couples, couples in Torino are quite similar to 
Italian ones as a whole. To ascertain this, I preliminarily analyzed a sample of dual-
earner couples drawn from the latest available time-use survey (2002-03) conducted in 
Italy by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). This survey includes an 
oversampling of Torino. I found small differences in terms of education, family size, 
and paid work time between couples living in different regions of the country. 
Narrowing the observation to dual-earner couples living in metropolitan areas 
(comparable to Torino) these small differences disappear, although the division of 
domestic labor continues to be more gendered in the South, whereas it is a bit more 
even in Torino than elsewhere (see Carriero, 2009).  
This finding could cast doubts on results drawn from the sample used in this article 
since a more balanced division of housework is likely to influence perceived fairness 
and satisfaction.3 However, the division of domestic labor is not my main independent 
variable. Even if a less gendered division of housework can contribute to increasing the 
general level of perceived fairness and satisfaction in my sample, it is unlikely that it 
can decisively alter the effect of the other variables (interpersonal comparisons, 
outcome values and justifications) and thus does not invalidate the results presented 
here. 
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The sample for this study was randomly chosen from landline telephone directories.4 
Data collection took place from November 2008 to February 2009 (excluding holiday 
weeks). Both partners in each couple were interviewed separately by telephone. 
Eligibility conditions for the interview were: 1) both partners must have been employed 
in the last 6 months and be currently (self-)employed; 2) they must have at least one 
child under the age of thirteen; 3) both partners should be available for interview. The 
response rate for couples of known eligibility was 63%. However, it was not possible to 
ascertain the eligibility status for a number of contacts who refused the interview. By 
including them in the computation, the overall response rate’s lower bound becomes 
28%.5 The final sample size was 404 couples with information from both partners.  
The questionnaire was designed to collect information on various topics relevant to the 
issues under investigation: time-use information (paid and unpaid work); individual and 
household demographics; retrospective information on work history; judgments 
(fairness and satisfaction ratings for the division of housework and childcare with the 
partner); attitudes related to family and housework (gender roles, personal preferences 
for cleanliness, comparison referents and other items inspired by Thompson & Major’s 
theory of distributive justice within the family). The average duration of the interviews 
was 30 minutes, ranging from 20 to 40 minutes. Details about the variables used in my 
analyses are given below.6 
 
 
Response variables 
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Fairness and satisfaction judgments are response variables that, suitably combined, 
represent the dependent variable of multinomial logistic regressions. Fairness 
perception was probed with a 5-point Likert-type item: 
Regarding the division of housework with your partner, do you personally think that 
what you do is much more than fair, a bit more than fair, fair, a little less than fair or 
much less than fair? 
Satisfaction was assessed with the following question: 
How much are you satisfied with the division of housework with your partner? (4-
point scale) 
Although one could plausibly assume that (dis)satisfaction is a consequence of (un) 
fairness (Baxter & Western, 1998), it seems safer to proceed as if both items were 
partial measures of an underlying concept – ‘sense of justice’ – which involves 
perception of equity and satisfaction feeling. I decided to derive a single indicator from 
the cross-classification of the two items, thus producing a typology. In this way one can 
understand which aspects of the concept are affected by different independent variables 
because regression analysis will treat fairness and satisfaction together while leaving 
these two dimensions distinct and recognizable. 
When combining fairness and satisfaction, I aggregated several categories of the cross-
classification (see next section for details) and dropped several others because of small 
cell size and/or little theoretical relevance. The wife’s judgment of the division of 
housework has three outcomes in multivariate analyses: fair & satisfied, more than fair 
but satisfied, more than fair & dissatisfied. The husband’s judgment also has three 
outcomes: fair & satisfied, less than fair but satisfied, less than fair & dissatisfied. 
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Predictor variables 
 
As my purpose is to evaluate how elements other than time and tasks influence 
judgments of the division of household labor, I primarily tried to assess the effect of the 
elements proposed by Thompson (1991), namely the outcome values of family work, 
the comparison referents and the justifications used for making judgments. Following 
previous work by Hawkins, Marshall et al. (1995), under constraints imposed by the 
need to have a relatively short questionnaire, respondents were asked to answer several 
questions that were intended to operationalize these theoretical elements. I selected a 
few of them for this analysis. Specifically, the outcome value of family work reported 
here consists of ‘feelings of appreciation’. The corresponding item, rated on a 5-point 
scale, is: 
I feel appreciated by my husband (my wife) when I do household tasks 
According to the theory, this item should be correlated with the sense of justice: the 
feeling of appreciation from the partner rewards for (at least part of) the effort devoted 
to housework. 
To investigate comparison referents relevant to fairness issues wives and husbands were 
asked to make four comparisons. The wife had to compare herself to her mother and to 
her female friends (in the same conditions, i.e., married or partnered, with children and 
employed); she also had to compare her husband to her father and to her (female) 
friends’ husbands. The husband had to make the same comparisons, changing the sex of 
the comparison referents (i.e., self to his father, wife to his mother, self to his male 
friends, and wife to his friends’ wives). In all cases, respondents were asked to say if 
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their own (or their spouse’s) housework time was about equal, lower or higher than the 
comparison referent. These are all items about within-gender comparisons: s/he has to 
compare her/him self with other women (men) or her/his partner with other men 
(women). No directly probed cross-gender comparisons are available in this survey. 
Lastly, for the justifications used to rationalize and make sense of feelings of 
fairness/satisfaction, I concentrate on two main arguments: difference in standards of 
cleanliness and ‘procedural justice’, i.e., shared agreement over the division of 
housework. Standards were measured indirectly by means of three items, inspired and 
partly adapted from Ogletree, Worthen et al. (2006), that were specifically designed to 
measure personal preferences about cleanliness: 
Leaving dirty dishes in the sink overnight bothers me. 
I can’t stand it if the bathroom is cleaned less than twice a week. 
I don’t care much if the house is messy. 
After averaging ratings (ranging 1 to 5, third item reversed), I took the difference 
between wife’s and husband’s scores in order to have a measure which is independent 
of explicit comparisons. The higher the difference, the higher her standards compared to 
his’. The hypothesis linked to this variable is that whoever has lower standards should 
feel entitled to be less involved in housework and thus s/he should also care less about 
inequality in the division of chores. Conversely, those who have higher standards– 
usually women – invest more time in housework to meet them, but do not perceive this 
extra investment to be unfair. 
The ‘procedural justice’ justification is represented by the following item (1-5 point 
scale, adapted from Hawkins et al. 1995): 
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My husband (wife) and I decided together and agreed regarding who does what 
about household chores and childcare tasks. 
Spouses who agree with this item should tolerate inequality better, on the grounds that  
if they believe that decisions were made jointly, they should have fewer reasons to 
complain afterwards. However, it should be borne in mind that asymmetries in power 
relations could lead to “agreements” on a quite different basis. 
 
Since the issue under examination involves explaining why spouses consider a division 
of housework that is objectively uneven to be fair and satisfying, it is important to 
control for the actual allocation of household labor. The division of unpaid labor was 
measured with several indexes derived from a set of questions about 13 household and 
childcare tasks (such as cooking and preparing meals, washing the dishes, vacuuming, 
ironing, shopping for groceries, etc.) that summarizes the percentage of activities 
personally performed out the total of activities performed by the family. Respondents 
(wives and husband separately) were asked first how many times each activity was 
performed in her/his family in total. They were then requested to say who performs each 
task and how often. Answer options were: ‘always me’, ‘much more often me’, ‘slightly 
more often me’, ‘equally shared with my partner’, slightly more often my partner’, 
‘much more often my partner’, ‘always my partner’ and ‘mostly others’ (i.e., other 
household members, relatives or paid help).  
The index derived from these questions combines the frequency of activities with the 
proportion of performance.7 For example, if ‘vacuuming & cleaning’ was performed 2-3 
times a week, and was equally shared by the partners, this item contributes to the index 
with 2.5*0.5 = 1.75 activities done by the wife. I created different versions of the index, 
 17 
summing different types of tasks: a ‘core housework index’, including routine domestic 
tasks only (cooking, cleaning, washing dishes, doing laundry, ironing, tidying-up); a 
‘sporadic housework index’, including shopping and non-routine domestic tasks (home 
and car maintenance, financial and administrative tasks); and a ‘childcare index’, 
including feeding, dressing, reading to children, taking children to/from school or other 
out-of-home activities.8 
The percentage of the couple’s net monthly income earned by the wife is a variable 
intended to measure her economic power, which can affect perceived fairness either 
indirectly (through its influence on the division of housework) or directly (perhaps 
through the mechanism of cognitive dissonance reduction). However, my focus of 
interest is not the exchange hypothesis and I consider the percentage of income earned 
by the wife as control. As the allocation of paid work is also likely to affect fairness and 
satisfaction considerations, I computed an index measuring the percentage of couple’s 
paid labor hours performed by the wife. Other variables, used as simple controls, are 
respondent’s age and education, and the number of children.  
 
ANALYSES 
 
Although none of the previous studies considered fairness and satisfaction 
simultaneously, this study replicates the main finding: the absolute majority of women 
(55.4%) and, less surprisingly, of men (55%) is satisfied and considers the housework to 
be fairly divided with the partner (see Table 1 and 2). Small proportions of wives 
(13.6%) and husbands (5.7%) report both unfairness and dissatisfaction. About a quarter 
of wives and a third of husbands acknowledge doing an unfair share of housework (i.e., 
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more than fair and less than fair respectively), but nonetheless consider themselves 
satisfied. Other combinations of perceived fairness and satisfaction, namely ‘less than 
fair & satisfied’ among women and ‘more than fair & satisfied’ among men, although 
theoretically interesting (as ‘innovative’ or counter-intuitive positions), are 
characteristic of very few cases (3% of women and men) and are not further 
investigated in this study. 
  
[table 1 & 2 here] 
 
These preliminary descriptive findings show that there can be a disjunction – whose 
origin should be investigated – between perceived unfairness and dissatisfaction. The 
former is frequently recognized by social actors, but the latter does not necessarily 
follow, perhaps because other factors (such as the need to avoid cognitive dissonance or 
desire to prevent conflict) intervene first.  
The apparent paradox of these judgments is that women and men report satisfaction and 
fairness even if the housework distribution is far from being even. The ‘golden rule’ of 
housework allocation appears to be 2/3 to the wife and 1/3 to the husband. Looking at 
the shares of housework (calculated through respondents’ subjective information), it 
seems that, for women, even small departures from this rule lead to an unfairness 
verdict, and substantive departures add dissatisfaction to unfairness. For men, 
departures from the ‘golden rule’ also result in a perception of unfairness (in both 
directions: to him and to her), but among those who admit that what they do is less than 
fair, the level of satisfaction does not depend on the (perceived) amount of housework 
done, which is on average 25% for both satisfied and dissatisfied husbands.  
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It is possible that a reason for dissatisfaction arises from different partners’ perceptions 
about what proportion of the housework is actually done by each. That this is possible is 
indicated by comparing housework allocation as calculated from subjective information 
reported by wives and husbands. As shown in Table 3, dissatisfaction seems to arise 
when there is a substantive difference (10 points) between what husband and wife 
perceive about the ‘real’ amount of housework allocated to her (in the case of husbands 
reporting ‘more than fair but satisfied’, there is also a substantive difference between the 
two spouses’ perceptions, but it must be taken with caution since it is based on only 12 
observations). 
 
[table 3 here] 
 
For the following multivariate analyses, I dropped the categories of the nominal 
dependent variables that contained too few observations. I am left with three outcomes 
of the wife’s and husband’s judgment (shaded cells of Table 2 and 3): fair & satisfied 
(reference category for both), unfair but satisfied, unfair & dissatisfied (for wives, unfair 
means that she does more than fair, for husbands that he does less than fair).  
The purpose of the multivariate analyses is to estimate the effects of the variables 
representing outcome values, comparison referents and justifications, net of 
theoretically relevant antecedent and concomitant variables. Consistently with this 
purpose, I will consider each variable at a time in separate regressions, focusing my 
remarks only on the variable of interest.9  
I included the following controls in the regression models: the Respondent’s percentage 
of core housework, the R’s percentage of sporadic housework, the R’s percentage of 
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childcare tasks – the distinction between kinds of household tasks is needed to account 
for their different practical and symbolic meanings – and the percentage of paid work 
hours performed by the wife as variables taking equity considerations across the main 
domains of time allocation into account; R’s age, years of education and the number of 
children as socio-demographic controls; wife’s relative income as a variable that 
controls for power asymmetries affecting the division of housework.  
Because of the observational and cross-sectional nature of this study, the independent 
variables’ causal status is questionable: frequently, we cannot rule out that certain 
relations between variables run the other way around. For example, the choice of 
specific comparison referents from the class of ‘friends in similar conditions’ can be a 
function of the respondent’s fairness and satisfaction perceptions in order to justify 
his/her judgment, or the feeling of being not appreciated by the partner when doing 
housework can be a consequence of dissatisfaction with the division of tasks. 
Unfortunately, I cannot test these hypotheses with available data, and this remains a 
limitation of this study to be addressed in future research. 
I start the analysis by presenting results that highlight the importance of various 
comparison referents for men and women. To save space, I do not show the full set of 
regressions (available upon request from the author), but only those yielding the most 
significant and interesting results. Out of the four kinds of (within-gender) comparison 
referents, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ do not appear to influence wives’ and husbands’ 
perceptions of fairness and satisfaction (results not shown), although in the case of the 
wife’s father-husband comparison it seems that when her father was absent (referent 
unavailable), she is more likely to judge the division of housework to be unfair.  
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[table 4 & 5 here] 
 
As for the other referents, I found that husbands are more likely to feel that the situation 
is unfair to their wives when they believe they do less housework than their friends (the 
effect is stronger for the outcome ‘unfair but satisfied’ than ‘unfair & dissatisfied’, see 
Table 4), but the same does not hold for women. When the reverse is true, i.e., when 
men believe their friends do less housework than themselves, the comparison does not 
significantly affect their judgment: the comparison effect is not symmetrical. The 
probability that a man perceives unfairness and dissatisfaction is also higher when he 
believes that his wife does more housework than other wives, but the reverse is not true 
(as one would expect it to be) when he thinks that his wife does less housework (results 
not shown).  
For wives, the relevant comparison referents are other husbands compared to their own: 
if women believe their husbands are contributing less to housework than other (known) 
husbands, they are more likely to report unfairness and dissatisfaction, but not 
unfairness with satisfaction (coefficients not significant, see Table 5).  
To have a concrete idea of how comparison referents influence the judgment, let us 
consider predicted probabilities: for a woman with average characteristics (control 
variables held at their sample mean or median), the probability that she will report 
unfairness and dissatisfaction is less than 3% when she believes her husband does more 
housework than other husbands, whereas it rises to 27% in the opposite case. For men, 
the effect is weaker: the predicted probability of reporting unfairness and dissatisfaction 
is 4% when they believe their friends do not differ from themselves in time spent on 
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household labor, but that probability increases only up to 12% when husbands think 
their friends do more housework than themselves. 
 
Finally, I report results from other regression analyses, where I consider the effects of 
outcome values and justifications.  
 
[table 6 and 7 here] 
 
The feeling of appreciation perceived when doing housework seems to affect 
satisfaction only in conjunction with the sense of fairness: when the wife (the husband) 
reports appreciation, it is less likely that she (he) feels dissatisfaction and unfairness. 
Shared agreement over the distribution of tasks has no effect on husbands’ judgments, 
whereas, as expected, it is negatively associated with wives’ perception of unfairness 
and dissatisfaction (results not shown). Again, as in the case of appreciation, this 
argument seems to be mobilized to compensate for the cognitive dissonance generated 
by an unfair allocation.  
 
[table 8 and 9 here] 
 
The difference between wife’s and husband’s standards of cleanliness, measured 
indirectly as mentioned above, has effects on both spouses’ judgments, but they are 
contrary to expectations. It was thought that this variable alleviates the sense of 
unfairness and dissatisfaction on the grounds that the partner with higher standards 
(usually the wife) would feel less entitled to complain about the division of housework. 
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On the contrary, the findings show that the higher the difference between the spouses’ 
preferences about the level of cleanliness, the higher the probability that partners (both 
wives and husbands) will find the allocation of housework unfair and dissatisfying (for 
husbands, this also seems to alter the sense of fairness regardless of the level of 
satisfaction, as witnessed by the positive coefficient for the ‘unfair but satisfied’ 
outcome). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although this study provides supporting evidence for each of the specific explanatory 
variables suggested by Thompson’s theoretical framework and taken into consideration 
here, a number of remarks should be made. The role of outcome values, and feelings of 
appreciation in particular, was found to be significant for both wives and husbands, but 
seems to influence satisfaction rather than perceived fairness (note that this result could 
emerge because fairness and satisfaction were combined and analyzed simultaneously, 
as otherwise they would have partially overlapped, confounding the analysis). This 
finding suggests that valued outcomes could represent some sort of ex-post 
rationalization for unfair allocations, which must nevertheless be accommodated for the 
internal consistency of actors’ beliefs system. If this is plausible, the role of valued 
outcomes is not conceptually very different from that of justifications. Of course, as 
mentioned, the cross-sectional nature of the data at hand does not permit a true causal 
interpretation of the relationship between feelings of appreciation and 
satisfaction/fairness. 
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Processes of social comparison are certainly at work in fairness judgments, and there is 
at least a reference behavior (i.e., men’s) common to both husbands and wives, although 
in the former case comparison referents are friends whereas in the latter they are other 
(male) individuals in a different position (not necessarily friends). For women, the 
comparison between their husband and other husbands is relevant, but only so far as the 
‘unfair & dissatisfied’ judgment is concerned; comparisons with their mother, father 
and female friends do not significantly influence women’s judgment.10 For men, friends 
and friends’ wives are relevant comparison referents, not mothers or fathers. 
Comparisons with friends are likely to make husbands feel ‘guilty’ (i.e., to perceive 
unfairness to the wife) if they believe their friends contribute more to the housework, 
while comparisons between their own wife and other wives increase the likelihood that 
they report unfairness with dissatisfaction, when men believe that their wife does more 
housework than other wives. Except for husbands’ comparisons of themselves and their 
friends, all comparisons are associated with the probability of reporting unfairness and 
dissatisfaction, not simply unfairness. Indeed, as the relative deprivation literature 
suggests, feelings of dissatisfaction are prompted by social comparison with relevant 
referents.  
All of the above are within-gender comparisons (i.e., husbands comparing themselves to 
other men and their wives to other women, and wives behaving symmetrically) which, 
according to Thompson, should foster perceived fairness. Indeed, I do not have a clear 
indication that within-gender as opposed to cross-gender comparison referents influence 
fairness perception – probably measures other than those available here would be 
required – but I do not see good reasons to presume that the two kinds of comparisons 
are in opposition. Furthermore, since a cross-gender comparison is basically the 
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comparison with his/her own partner, its effect might be assessed indirectly from the 
coefficient of the housework ratio or proportion, as in Gager & Hohmann-Marriot 
(2006). However, a more relevant question would be: which characteristics of women 
and men or which social contexts prompt them to make within- or cross-gender 
comparisons? This is an old and unresolved theoretical problem – ‘Who compares with 
whom?’ (Gartrell, 2002) – and perhaps calls into question the role of gender ideologies 
which, according to Greenstein (1996), should influence the choice of comparison 
referents. Greenstein (2009) also maintains that national contexts provide individuals 
with a generalized comparative referent and that in nations where gender inequality is 
more pronounced couple-level inequalities are more likely to be considered fair. As this 
likely applies to Italy, interpersonal comparisons have here a more salient significance. 
For an Italian woman it will be easier to find that her husband is more collaborative than 
average if this average is quite “low” (a similar reasoning applies to Italian men). I 
believe that this aspect should be investigated in greater depth and in comparative 
perspective in future empirical research, for example by collecting information on the 
characteristics of the couple’s social network: how many friends of both sexes, how 
frequently met, the degree of friends’ socio-cultural heterogeneity, etc.11 
The role of justifications, as conceptualized and measured in this study, is more 
controversial. The ‘procedural justice’ argument worked as expected among wives who 
are less likely to report unfairness and dissatisfaction if they agreed on the allocation of 
tasks with their husbands. For husbands, however, no association was found between 
this justification and their judgment, perhaps revealing that it is a kind of gendered 
rationalization that serves to alleviate women’s sense of injustice but does not lighten 
men’s consciousness of their unfair contribution to housework.  
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The other justification examined, namely the difference in cleanliness standards 
between partners, had a completely unexpected effect on fairness and satisfaction: the 
higher the difference (meaning that the wife is more demanding), the higher the 
probability that she reports unfairness and dissatisfaction or that the husband perceives 
unfairness toward his wife. This result could mean that the wife is disappointed that her 
husband will not help reach the desired level of cleanliness and tidiness at home; 
alternatively, for men, it could signify that they are aware of their inadequate 
contribution to housework and, precisely for that reason, are more likely to 
acknowledge the unfairness of the burden they pass on to the wife. More generally, the 
difference in standards could signal a disagreement potential which raises the salience 
of conflict in the relationship and thus makes the perception of injustice more likely 
(Molm et al., 2006). 
These are of course post-hoc interpretations for unexpected results. On the other hand, 
justifications, like all ex-post rationalizations, lend themselves to multiple and 
contradictory uses. In this respect, justifications are the weakest element of Thompson’s 
theoretical framework. However, if the post-hoc interpretation of the ‘difference in 
standards’ effect is valid, it can be grounded in a relative deprivation mechanism: a 
woman who has higher standards of cleanliness than her partner feels deprived – i.e., 
perceives more unfairness and dissatisfaction – because she knows he will not cooperate 
in achieving that standard. 
All in all, Thompson’s conceptual framework remains a useful tool for analyzing 
fairness perception about the division of family labor. It invites the researcher to pay 
attention not only to practical aspects of household and care tasks but also to a wide 
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range of symbolic meanings and values and to the embeddedness of spouses in a host of 
social relationships that provide them with multiple occasions of comparison.  
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NOTES
 
1 I use “wife” and “husband” to refer to both married and cohabiting persons.  
2 Kaufmann (1993: cp. 5) also recognized the problematic nature of the difference between her standards 
and his’, acknowledging that a “separation of territories” (i.e., a specialisation in the tasks that one cares 
more about) is functional to the preservation of harmony. 
3 Indeed, from the time-use survey mentioned in the text, it turns out that women in dual-earner couples 
living in the South are slightly less satisfied with the division of housework than women living in the 
North or in the Center. 
4 This choice may have led to some selection bias towards more highly educated people. Telephone 
directory coverage for the target population is not known for the period in which fieldwork was 
conducted. Though the most recent estimate (2003, based on data provided by ISTAT) was 95%, it is 
likely that coverage was lower at the end of 2008. 
5 Since it is unlikely that all unknown refusals were out of target, the true response rate is likely to be 
higher than 28%. 
6 Micro-data and survey documentation are freely available from the website www.torinosociallab.org. 
English versions of the questionnaire are available upon request from the author. 
7 The values I attributed to the weekly frequency of execution are: 14 (every day, more than once), 7 
(once a day), 4.5 (4-5 times per week), 2.5 (2-3 times per week), 1 (once a week), 0.25 (less often). For 
the sharing of tasks, I use the following proportions: 1(always me), 0.85 (much more often me), 0.65 
(slightly more often me), 0.5 (equally shared with my partner), 0.35 (slightly more often my partner), 0.15 
(much more often my partner), 0 (always my partner).  
8 I used the index derived from wives’ answers to household items to analyse wives’ judgments, and 
husbands’ answers to analyse husbands’ judgments. Men’s and women’s perceptions about the frequency 
of task execution are different at the couple level and it seemed better and more consistent to use the same 
source of information for regressing fairness and satisfaction ratings. 
9 This model specification style – looking for the effects of a given cause – is at odds with approaches 
that try to include all the possible ‘determinants’ of a given effect (Gelman & Hill, 2007: part 1B; Sobel, 
1996). In any case, the moderate sample size would not make it possible to include many predictors in the 
models, considering that in multinomial logistic regression the number of parameters to be estimated 
grows with the number of response variable categories. 
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10 To borrow terminology from Wright and Tropp (2002), perceived unfairness with satisfaction can be 
described as cognitive relative deprivation, and unfairness with dissatisfaction as affective relative 
deprivation. 
11 Interpersonal comparisons has not received much attention in the housework literature. With few 
exceptions (Buunk et al., 2000; Gager, 1998 for instance) comparisons were usually treated as 
“exogenous” (e.g. something that individuals are simply exposed to), while they could be “endogenous” 
as well (e.g. something that individuals actively seek to justify their feelings). Agent-based simulation is a 
technique that seems particularly well suited for studying the role of social comparisons in the genesis of 
relative deprivation sentiments (for an example see Manzo, 2011).  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Cross-classification of wives’ fairness perceptions and satisfaction ratings (percentage share of core 
housework performed in italics in brackets) 
She is… 
She thinks what she does is… 
Not very/ not at all satisfied Fairly/ very much satisfied 
A little less/ much less than fair 
0.5% 
n=2 
- 
3.2% 
n=13 
(53.9) 
Fair 
2.0% 
n=8 
- 
55.4% 
n=224 
(66.5) 
A bit more/ much more than fair 
13.6% 
n=55 
(82.1) 
25.3% 
n=102 
(70.9) 
 
Table 2 Cross-classification of husbands’ fairness perceptions and satisfaction ratings (percentage share of core 
housework performed in italics in brackets) 
He is… 
He thinks what he does is… 
Not very/ not at all satisfied Fairly/ very much satisfied 
A little less/ much less than fair 
5.7% 
n=23 
(25.3) 
35.6% 
n=144 
(25.5) 
Fair 
0.5% 
n=2 
- 
55.0% 
n=222 
(32.5) 
A bit more/ much more than fair 
0.2% 
n=1 
- 
3.0% 
n=12 
(42.0) 
 
Table 3 Wife’s share of core housework (%) according to her and to him, by wife’s and husband’s judgment 
 
Wife’s % of housework calculated 
through… 
 
Wife’s judgment W’s information H’s information Difference W-H 
    
fair & satisfied 66.5 63.0 3.5 
more than fair but satisfied 70.9 64.6 6.3 
more than fair & dissatisfied 82.1 72.5 9.6 
less than fair but satisfied 53.9 55.6 -1.7 
    
Husband's judgment    
    
fair & satisfied 65.4 61.0 4.4 
less than fair but satisfied 74.7 70.1 4.6 
less than fair & dissatisfied 84.8 74.2 10.6 
more than fair but satisfied 66.4 55.3 11.1 
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Table 4 Effects of comparison referents on wives’ judgments, multinomial logistic regressions coefficients 
 
more than fair & satisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied  
more than fair & dissatisfied  
vs. fair & satisfied 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
        
Compared to other husbands…        
Her husband does less housework 0.40  0.42  1.50 ** 0.47 
Her husband does more housework -0.23  0.28  -1.32 ** 0.49 
She does not know -0.88  0.82  0.68  0.69 
(Ref.: her husband does same housework)        
R’s % of core housework 0.02 * 0.01  0.06 ** 0.01 
R’s % of sporadic housework 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
R’s % of childcare tasks 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Age 0.03  0.03  0.10 ** 0.04 
No. of children 0.10  0.20  -0.41  0.32 
Years education -0.01  0.04  0.03  0.06 
Wife’s % of paid work hours 0.04 * 0.02  0.07 ** 0.03 
Wife’s % of couple’s income -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02 
Constant -4.83 ** 1.79  -13.73 ** 2.67 
 
N = 381 
 
Note: +: p<0.1  *: p<0.05  **: p<0.01        
 
Table 5 Effects of comparison referents on husbands’ judgments, multinomial logistic regressions coefficients 
 
less than fair & satisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied  
less than fair & dissatisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Compared to his friends…        
He does more housework -0.29  0.25  -0.26  0.57 
He does less housework 1.09 ** 0.38  1.66 ** 0.63 
He does not know -0.55  0.56  0.54  0.89 
(ref.: He does same housework)        
R’s % of core housework -0.03 ** 0.01  -0.03 + 0.02 
R’s % of sporadic housework 0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01 
R’s % of childcare tasks 0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.02 
Age 0.03  0.02  0.10 * 0.04 
No. of children -0.21  0.19  -0.11  0.39 
Years education 0.07 * 0.03  0.00  0.06 
Wife’s % of paid work hours -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.03 
Wife’s % of couple’s income 0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Constant -0.67  1.11  -5.48 * 2.33 
 
N = 388 
 
Note: +: p<0.1  *: p<0.05  **: p<0.01        
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Table 6 Effects of ‘feelings of appreciation’ on wives’ judgments, multinomial logistic regressions coefficients 
 
more than fair fair & 
satisfied vs. fair & satisfied  
more than fair & dissatisfied  
vs. fair & satisfied 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
She feels appreciated by partner when 
doing housework (recoded item, 1 = yes) -0.27  0.25  -1.24 ** 0.36 
R’s % of core housework 0.02 * 0.01  0.08 ** 0.01 
R's % of sporadic housework 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
R's % of childcare tasks 0.01  0.01  0.03 * 0.01 
Age 0.03  0.03  0.10 ** 0.04 
No. of children 0.12  0.20  -0.30  0.31 
Years education -0.02  0.04  0.01  0.06 
Wife’s % of paid work hours 0.04 * 0.02  0.06 * 0.03 
Wife’s % of couple’s income -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Constant -4.69 ** 1.72  -15.10 ** 2.57 
 
N = 381 
 
Note: +: p<0.1  *: p<0.05  **: p<0.01        
 
Table 7 Effects of ‘feelings of appreciation’ on husbands’ judgments, multinomial logistic regressions coefficients 
 
less than fair & satisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied  
less than fair & dissatisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
He feels appreciated by partner when 
doing housework (recoded item, 1 = yes) -0.18  0.31  -1.04 * 0.51 
R’s % of core housework -0.03 ** 0.01  -0.04 * 0.02 
R's % of sporadic housework 0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01 
R's % of childcare tasks 0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.02 
Age 0.03  0.02  0.10 * 0.04 
No. of children -0.23  0.19  -0.05  0.37 
Years education 0.06 * 0.03  -0.02  0.06 
Wife’s % of paid work hours -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.03 
Wife’s % of couple’s income 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Constant 0.08  1.10  -3.73  2.28 
 
N = 388 
 
Note: +: p<0.1  *: p<0.05  **: p<0.01        
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Table 8 Effects of ‘difference in standards’ on wives’ judgments, multinomial logistic regressions coefficients  
 
more than fair & satisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied  
more than fair & dissatisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Difference in standards of cleanliness 
(higher scores = higher wife’s standards) -0.09  0.09  0.25 * 0.12 
R’s % of core housework 0.02  0.01  0.07 ** 0.01 
R's % of sporadic housework 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
R's % of childcare tasks 0.00  0.01  0.02 + 0.01 
Age 0.03  0.03  0.11  0.04 
No. of children 0.12  0.20  -0.31  0.30 
Years education -0.01  0.04  0.03  0.05 
Wife’s % of paid work hours 0.04 * 0.02  0.06 * 0.02 
Wife’s % of couple’s income -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Constant -5.02 ** 1.72  -15.34 ** 2.53 
 
N = 381 
 
Note: +: p<0.1  *: p<0.05  **: p<0.01        
 
Table 9 Effects of ‘difference in standards’ on husbands’ judgments, multinomial logistic regressions coefficients 
 
less than fair & satisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied  
less than fair & dissatisfied 
vs. fair & satisfied 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Difference in standards of cleanliness 
(higher scores = higher wife’s standards) 0.25 ** 0.08  0.32 + 0.17 
R’s % of core housework -0.03 * 0.01  -0.03 * 0.02 
R's % of sporadic housework 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
R's % of childcare tasks 0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.02 
Age 0.03  0.02  0.09 * 0.04 
No. of children -0.21  0.19  -0.07  0.38 
Years education 0.05  0.03  -0.03  0.06 
Wife’s % of paid work hours -0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.03 
Wife’s % of couple’s income 0.01  0.01  0.02 + 0.02 
Constant -0.19  1.08  -4.52 * 2.20 
 
N = 388 
 
Note: +: p<0.1  *: p<0.05  **: p<0.01        
 
 
